Y Comisiwn Etholiadol

Y corff annibynnol sy'n goruchwylio etholiadau a rheoleiddio cyllid gwleidyddol yn y DU

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Cynlluniau peilot adnabod pleidleiswyr Mai 2018

Darllenwch adroddiad cynlluniau peilot cardiau adnabod pleidleiswyr Mai 2018 yn llawn (PDF)

Crynodeb o'r canfyddiadau allweddol

Yn gyffredinol, gweithiodd y gofynion adnabod pleidleiswyr a dreialwyd ym mis Mai 2018 yn dda. Roedd bron pawb yn y pum ardal cynllun peilot a aeth i bleidleisio yn eu gorsaf bleidleisio yn gallu dangos prawf adnabod heb anhawster. Roedd nifer bobl na wnaethant bleidleisio am nad oeddent yn gallu dangos prawf adnabod yn fach iawn.

Roedd pobl yn yr ardaloedd lle cynhaliwyd y cynlluniau peilot yn llai tebygol o lawer o feddwl bod twyll etholiadol wedi digwydd na phobl mewn ardaloedd eraill lle cynhaliwyd etholiadau ym mis Mai 2018. Roedd Swyddogion Canlyniadau a'u staff mewn gorsafoedd pleidleisio yn gallu cynnal y prosesau newydd yn dda a heb unrhyw broblemau mawr.

Mae'r cynlluniau peilot hyn wedi darparu tystiolaeth gychwynnol ddefnyddiol a phwysig ynglŷn â sut y gallai gofyniad o ran adnabod pleidleiswyr ym Mhrydain Fawr weithio yn ymarferol. Maent hefyd wedi amlygu meysydd lle mae angen gwneud rhagor o waith, gan nad oes digon o dystiolaeth eto i fynd i'r afael yn llawn â phryderon ac ateb cwestiynau am effaith gofynion adnabod ar bleidleiswyr.

Nid oedd yr awdurdodau yn Lloegr a gymerodd ran yng nghynlluniau peilot 2018 yn ddigon amrywiol i fod yn gynrychioliadol o'r ardaloedd gwahanol a'r grwpiau gwahanol o bobl ar draws gweddill Prydain Fawr. Mae hyn yn golygu na allwn fod yn siŵr a fyddai pobl mewn ardaloedd eraill yn cael problemau o ran dangos prawf adnabod.

Gwyddom hefyd o waith dadansoddi blaenorol ac adborth gan sefydliadau eraill fel Mencap ac RNIB fod rhai grwpiau o bobl yn ei chael hi'n anoddach nag eraill i ddangos pasbort, trwydded yrru neu gerdyn teithio fel rhan o gynllun adnabod ar ffurf llun. Mae gennym rywfaint o dystiolaeth gyfyngedig o'r cynlluniau peilot hyn sy'n nodi bod pobl iau a'r rheini nad ydynt bob amser yn pleidleisio yn llai tebygol o ddweud y byddent yn ei chael hi'n hawdd dangos prawf adnabod. Mae angen gwneud mwy o waith er mwyn sicrhau y gall y bobl hyn gael y math cywir o brawf adnabod yn hawdd er mwyn gallu pleidleisio.

Pan wahoddodd Llywodraeth y DU gynghorau lleol i gynnal cynlluniau peilot ym mis Mai 2018, dywedodd hefyd ei bod yn fodlon ystyried cynnal cynlluniau peilot mewn etholiadau yn y dyfodol. Gwnaethom gytuno y byddai'n ddefnyddiol casglu mwy o dystiolaeth o gynlluniau peilot eraill mewn etholiadau yn 2019.

Mae'r cynlluniau peilot hyn wedi dangos y gall fod sawl ffordd o gyflwyno cynllun adnabod pleidleiswyr ym Mhrydain Fawr. Dylai Llywodraeth y DU ganolbwyntio yn awr ar ba dystiolaeth arall sydd ei hangen arnynt i ateb cwestiynau a mynd i'r afael â phryderon am effaith fanylach gofyniad adnabod pleidleiswyr, a sut y bydd dyluniad cynlluniau peilot yn y dyfodol yn helpu i ddarparu'r dystiolaeth honno.

Rydym wedi nodi rhai gwersi pwysig o gynlluniau peilot 2018 yn yr adroddiad hwn ac wedi gwneud argymhellion ar gyfer gwaith pellach a chynlluniau peilot yn y dyfodol. Byddai'r argymhellion hyn, a restrir ar dudalennau 19-21 isod, yn helpu i ddarparu'r sail dystiolaeth orau posibl ar gyfer unrhyw benderfyniadau ynglŷn â gofynion adnabod i bleidleiswyr mewn gorsafoedd pleidleisio ym Mhrydain Fawr.

Ein prif argymhelliad yw y dylai Llywodraeth y DU annog ystod ehangach o gynghorau lleol i gynnal cynlluniau peilot ym mis Mai 2019. Dylai'r rhain gynnwys cymysgedd o ardaloedd gwledig ac ardaloedd trefol mawr, ac ardaloedd â phroffiliau demograffig gwahanol. Byddai hyn yn helpu i sicrhau bod tystiolaeth fanylach am effaith prawf adnabod ar grwpiau gwahanol o bobl.

Ein hargymhellion

  • Dylai Llywodraeth y DU sicrhau ystod ehangach o gynghorau lleol i gynnal cynlluniau peilot ym mis Mai 2019
  • Dylai Llywodraeth y DU nodi'n fwy penodol sut y dylid llunio a chynnal cynlluniau peilot ym mis Mai 2019
  • Dylai Llywodraeth y DU a Swyddogion Canlyniadau weithio gyda'r Comisiwn Cydraddoldeb a Hawliau Dynol a sefydliadau sy'n cynrychioli pobl ag anghenion gwahanol i gynnal Asesiadau o'r Effaith ar Gydraddoldeb ar gyfer cynlluniau peilot yn y dyfodol
  • Dylai cynlluniau peilot yn y dyfodol barhau i gynnwys opsiynau i bobl nad oes ganddynt unrhyw un o'r mathau gofynnol o brawf adnabod
  • Dylai Llywodraeth y DU gynnal gwaith pellach i nodi pa fathau o brawf adnabod amgen sydd ar gael i bobl a fyddai'n ei chael hi'n anoddach dangos eu pasbort, trwydded yrru neu gerdyn teithio, yn enwedig pobl â nodweddion gwarchodedig fel y'u diffinnir gan y Ddeddf Cydraddoldeb
  • Dylai Llywodraeth y DU gynnal gwaith pellach i gasglu mwy o dystiolaeth ar lefelau sicrwydd y prawf adnabod a ddarperir gan fathau gwahanol o ddogfennau
  • Dylai Llywodraeth y DU gynnal gwaith pellach i gadarnhau a ellid cynnwys cardiau pleidleisio fel prawf adnabod derbyniol heb fod angen technoleg sganio mewn gorsafoedd pleidleisio

Bromley voter identification pilot scheme evaluation

In the Bromley voter identification pilot, voters were required to show one form of photographic identification or two forms of non-photographic identification (one of which needed to include the full registered address of the elector) in order to be given a ballot paper. We found that:
  • The majority of voters were able to meet the identification requirements upon arriving at the polling station. However, some electors did not have the required ID available when they came to vote on 3 May. The majority later returned and were able to cast a vote.
  • There is no evidence that the ID requirement significantly deterred electors from voting. In our public opinion survey only one respondent told us that they had not voted as a result of the ID requirement. Also, turnout at the 2018 polls was similar to the comparable elections in 2014.
  • We cannot draw firm conclusions about whether the ID requirement had a disproportionate impact on particular groups of people, for example those with a learning or physical disability. While we have seen no evidence that specific groups struggled with the ID requirement it is challenging to gather evidence in this area as relatively small groups of people could have been affected in different ways..
  • The delivery of this pilot was manageable for the Returning Officer and their staff and there is nothing in their experience of the pilot to suggest that Bromley would face significant issues with the administration of a similar ID requirement in the future. Additional staffing and training were in place for the pilot. However the Returning Officer has indicated that the extra staff would not necessarily be required to deliver this type of ID requirement at future local elections.
  • Public attitudes to electoral fraud improved from before to after the pilot. More people said that electoral fraud is not a problem in Bromley in May 2018 than did so in January 2018. However, we cannot definitively link this change to the pilot.

Our findings suggest that the 2018 local elections in Bromley were not significantly affected by the voter ID pilot in either its impact on voters or on the administration of the poll. However, it is important to be cautious when drawing conclusions from this pilot about the impact of any wider application of voter ID.

Read the Bromley report in full (PDF).

Gosport voter identification pilot scheme evaluation

The voter identification pilot scheme in Gosport required voters to produce one form of photographic identification or two forms of non-photographic identification (one of which must have shown the full registered address of the elector) or an electoral identity letter in order to meet the requirements to vote. Our evaluation of the scheme found that:
  • The majority of voters were able to meet the identification requirements upon arriving at the polling station. However, some electors did not have the required ID available when they came to vote on 3 May. The majority later returned and were able to cast a vote.
  • There is no evidence that the ID requirement significantly deterred electors from voting. In our public opinion surveys two non-voters told us that ID was the reason they had not voted. Also, turnout at the 2018 polls was similar to the comparable elections in 2016. It is possible that some electors were deterred from voting, believing correctly or incorrectly that they did not have ID, but this seems unlikely to apply to significant numbers.
  • We cannot draw firm conclusions about whether the ID requirement had a disproportionate impact on particular groups of people, for example those with a learning or physical disability. While we have seen no evidence that specific groups struggled with the ID requirement, it is challenging to gather evidence in this area as relatively small groups of people could have been affected in different ways.
  • The delivery of this pilot was manageable for the Returning Officer and their staff and there is nothing in their experience of the pilot to suggest that Gosport would face significant issues with the administration of a similar ID requirement in the future. Additional staffing and training were in place for the pilot. However, the Returning Officer has indicated that the extra staff would not be required to deliver this type of ID requirement at future local elections or those polls with higher turnout.
  • Public attitudes to electoral fraud did not significantly change from before to after the pilot. Slightly more people said they think electoral fraud is a problem in Gosport in May 2018 than did so in January 2018.

Our findings suggest that the 2018 local elections in Gosport were not significantly affected by the voter ID pilot in either its impact on voters or on the administration of the poll. However, it is important to be cautious when drawing conclusions from this pilot about the impact of any wider application of voter ID.

Read the Gosport report in full (PDF).

Swindon voter identification pilot scheme evaluation

The voter identification pilot scheme in Swindon required voters to produce their poll card in order to meet the requirement to vote. The poll card contained a QR code which was scanned in the polling station. If a voter did not bring their poll card they could show photo ID (from a specified list) or have their identity ‘attested’ by another elector (with ID) registered at the same polling station. Our evaluation of the scheme found that:
  • The majority of voters were able to meet the identification requirements upon arriving at the polling station. However, some electors did not have the required ID available when they came to vote on 3 May. The majority later returned and were able to cast a vote.
  • There is no evidence that the ID requirement deterred electors from voting. In our public opinion surveys no non-voter told us that ID was the reason they had not voted. Also, turnout at the 2018 polls was higher than the comparable elections in 2016. It is possible that some electors were deterred from voting, believing correctly or incorrectly that they did not have ID, but this seems unlikely to apply to significant numbers.
  • We cannot draw firm conclusions about whether the ID requirement had a disproportionate impact on particular groups of people, for example those with a learning or physical disability. While we have seen no evidence that specific groups struggled with the ID requirement it is challenging to gather evidence in this area as relatively small groups of people could have been affected in different ways.
  • The delivery of this pilot was manageable for the Returning Officer and their staff and, aside from the IT element, there is nothing in their experience of the pilot to suggest that Swindon would face significant issues with the administration of a similar ID requirement in the future. While the IT worked well on 3 May the development and set up was a significant demand on time and resource.
  • Public attitudes to electoral fraud did not significantly change from before to after the pilot. The same proportion of people said they think electoral fraud is a problem in Swindon in May 2018 as did so in January 2018.

Our findings suggest that the 2018 local elections in Swindon were not significantly affected by the voter ID pilot in either its impact on voters or on the administration of the poll. However, it is important to be cautious when drawing conclusions from this pilot about the impact of any wider application of voter ID.

Read the Swindon report in full (PDF).

Watford voter identification pilot scheme evaluation

The voter identification pilot scheme in Watford required voters to produce their poll card in order to meet the requirement to vote. The poll card contained a QR code which was scanned in the polling station. If a voter did not bring their poll card they could show photo ID (from a specified list) or a valid debit/credit card. Our evaluation of the scheme found that:
  • The majority of voters were able to meet the identification requirements upon arriving at the polling station. However, some electors did not have the required ID available when they came to vote on 3 May. The majority later returned and were able to cast a vote.
  • There is no evidence that the ID requirement deterred electors from voting. In our public opinion survey no non-voter in Watford told us that ID was the reason they had not voted. 2018 turnout was higher than the comparable elections in 2016. It is possible that some electors were deterred from voting, believing correctly or incorrectly that they did not have ID, but this seems unlikely to apply to significant numbers.
  • We cannot draw firm conclusions about whether the ID requirement had a disproportionate impact on particular groups of people, for example those with a learning or physical disability. While we have seen no evidence that specific groups struggled with the ID requirement it is challenging to gather evidence in this area as relatively small groups of people could have been affected in different ways. A disproportionate number of those unable to show ID on 3 May were from electoral wards with higher proportions of people with an Asian background. However, this does not mean that electors from the Asian community were more likely to be affected by the ID requirement.
  • The delivery of this pilot was manageable for the Returning Officer and their staff and, aside from the IT element, there is nothing in their experience of the pilot to suggest that Watford would face significant issues with the administration of a similar ID requirement in the future. While the IT worked well on 3 May the development and set up was a significant demand on time and resource.
  • Some public attitudes to electoral fraud improved from before to after the pilot. Fewer people said they thought electoral fraud was a problem in May 2018 than in January 2018. However, we cannot definitively link this change to the pilot.

Our findings suggest that the 2018 local elections in Watford were not significantly affected by the voter ID pilot in either its impact on voters or on the administration of the poll. However, it is important to be cautious when drawing conclusions from this pilot about the impact of any wider application of voter ID.

Read the Watford report in full (PDF).

Woking voter identification pilot scheme evaluation

The voter identification pilot scheme in Woking required voters to produce one form of photographic identification or a Local Elector Card in order to meet the requirements to vote. Our evaluation of the scheme found that:
  • The majority of voters were able to meet the identification requirements upon arriving at the polling station. However, some electors did not have the required ID available when they came to vote on 3 May. The majority later returned and were able to cast a vote.
  • There is no evidence that the ID requirement significantly deterred electors from voting. In our public opinion surveys one non-voter told us that ID was the reason they had not voted. Also, turnout at the 2018 polls was similar to the comparable elections in 2014. It is possible that some electors were deterred from voting, believing correctly or incorrectly that they did not have ID, but this seems unlikely to apply to significant numbers.
  • We cannot draw firm conclusions about whether the ID requirement had a disproportionate impact on particular groups of people, for example those with a learning or physical disability. While we have seen no evidence that specific groups struggled with the ID requirement it is challenging to gather evidence in this area as relatively small groups of people could have been affected in different ways.
  • The delivery of this pilot was manageable for the Returning Officer and their staff and there is nothing in their experience of the pilot to suggest that Woking would face significant issues with the administration of a similar ID requirement in the future. Some additional staffing and training were in place for the pilot. However the Returning Officer has indicated that the extra staff would not necessarily be required to deliver this type of ID requirement at future local elections.
  • Some public attitudes to electoral fraud improved from before to after the pilot. Fewer people said they felt electoral fraud is a problem in Woking in May 2018 than did so in January 2018. However, we cannot definitively link this change to the pilot.

Our findings suggest that the 2018 local elections in Watford were not significantly affected by the voter ID pilot in either its impact on voters or on the administration of the poll. However, it is important to be cautious when drawing conclusions from this pilot about the impact of any wider application of voter ID.

Read the Woking report in full (PDF).

Postal and proxy voting pilot schemes

At the May 2018 elections the Returning Officers (ROs) for Peterborough, Slough and Tower Hamlets ran pilot schemes focused on postal voting.

The ROs sent information to postal voters about how to protect their vote. They then contacted a sample of postal voters, who had been sent postal voting packs, to check that they had applied for them. In Peterborough and Tower Hamlets, they also contacted a sample of postal voters, whose postal ballot had been returned, to check that they had completed and returned their own vote. Peterborough also ran a pilot scheme to require proxy voters at polling stations to show identification before issuing them with a ballot paper.

Impact of the pilot schemes

The pilots were well delivered by the three ROs but we have not been able to draw firm conclusions on the impact of these pilot schemes. This was partly because in some cases there was no relevant data from before the pilots to compare against, and also because we were not able to tell what would have happened this year without the pilot schemes.

Impact of the leaflet for postal voters

There is no clear evidence about the impact of the leaflet for postal voters, although it is reasonable to conclude that well-designed and carefully worded information is likely to help encourage people to report evidence about electoral fraud.

Impact of the follow-up contact with postal voters

Postal voters welcomed the follow-up contact from the RO and the telephone activity was largely manageable with some additional staff. However, the household visit approach, as used in Peterborough, required more resources than the RO would normally be able to commit around a poll. There is no clear evidence about the impact on allegations of fraud and public confidence, although it may have provided reassurance to some voters.

The follow-up contact provided the ROs with additional information about potential cases of electoral fraud. While they could use this information to raise specific concerns with the police, the activity did not directly lead to any allegations being referred to the police at these elections.

Finally, the pilot allowed for the cancellation of postal votes where the elector said they did not want a postal vote or claimed that they had not completed a returned postal vote. The ROs did not need to make significant use of this power (one postal vote was cancelled for this reason in Peterborough) but it is logical that they should have this option available to them as part of any follow up activity with postal voters.

Impact of the identification requirement for proxy voters

The identification requirement for proxy voters was administratively manageable, and there is limited evidence of a negative impact on voters.

Peterborough believe there may have been some effect in deterring fraudulent proxy activity as the number of proxies was notably lower than in recent polls. However, it is not possible to draw a clear conclusion from the information available.

Impact on allegations of fraud

We have looked at data from police forces about allegations of electoral fraud in these three areas. They received a very small number of allegations about postal voting at the May 2018 elections. We cannot draw any firm conclusions from this limited data, particularly because we cannot know what would have happened in these areas without the pilot scheme procedures.

Read the postal and proxy voting pilot schemes report in full (PDF).

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