Formal response to the Speaker’s Conference report

The leadership of all parties represented in Parliament and the Electoral Commission should engage constructively with the Speaker to develop a code of conduct for campaigning, to be agreed and in place at the next general election. (Paragraph 28)

Our response

• A code of conduct for campaigning will facilitate a robust but respectful campaigning environment by making it clearer that campaigners are accountable for their conduct and by building a shared understanding of what constitutes fair and open campaigning.
• The UK Government has endorsed the Conference’s call for a code, including it in its strategy for modern elections. We are keen to work closely with parties and campaigners, the Ministry for Housing, Communities and Local Government, and Mr Speaker to update and expand the existing code of conduct to set the expectations on fair and open campaigning. We recommend that the existing, non-statutory code be strengthened, rather than introducing an additional code, in order to avoid confusion and unnecessary complexity for campaigners.
• This is a significant piece of work, and we have therefore considered what might be possible ahead of May’s elections to support our shared objective of a safe and secure campaigning environment for everyone. We will begin by developing a foundational set of respectful campaigning principles.
• We intend to work with parties, through the Parliamentary Parties Panels, to agree a high-level set of principles. We hope to have these agreed in time to guide campaigning at the May 2026 elections. Drafting and agreeing these principles before campaigning begins is dependent on several factors, including parties working collaboratively together. To inform this work, we have requested a copy of parties’ own codes of conduct. We will analyse these and identify common themes, which we will consider alongside evidence from this report. To embed and publicise principles ahead of May, we will ask parties, campaigners, and ROs to include them as part of their candidate and agents’ briefings. This will help ensure they reach independent candidates. We will also share principles with local police election Single Points of Contact (SPOC) and Force Elected-Official Advisors (FEOA).
• After May, we will evaluate how the principles worked in practice to develop the detail of the expanded code. A total of 4,515 candidates stood for election across almost 100 political parties at the last general election. For this reason, extensive consultation with a wide range of parties and campaigners will be essential to ensure the code captures and addresses the specific challenges and practical realities of today’s rich and varied campaigning landscape.

The Government should monitor and record the use of Disqualification Orders under the Elections Act 2022, review their effectiveness, and report the results to Parliament by means of a Written Ministerial Statement. The Government should also submit a report to the Speaker’s Committee on the Electoral Commission, as soon as feasibly possible and at the latest in time for reforms to be implemented at least six months before the next general election, in line with the Gould principle. (Paragraph 37)

Our response

• We have responded to this recommendation in full in our responses to recommendations in the second report below.

Every police force should produce a fully risk-assessed policing plan ahead of a general election period. (Paragraph 45)

Our response

• Candidate security policing plans would help to address inconsistencies in police responses, by clearly identifying risks and responses ahead of election periods. Election fraud Single Points of Contact (SPOCs) already produce policing plans, using guidance from the College for Policing and the Commission. These plans provide an example of best practice, that could be replicated and used when drawing up security policing plans for general elections. Force Elected-Official Advisors (FEOA) and Bridger SPOCs should work with election fraud SPOCs to share information and ensure co-ordinated responses, since there is often overlap between their work – with some cases including both fraud and security offences.
• Our research following the UK general election in 2024 showed that candidates had mixed experiences with police responses. Candidates told us in our survey following the 2024 general election they experienced inconsistencies in how police forces responded to reported incidents. Some candidates told us that the designated SPOC officers did not contact them, even in hotly contested constituencies where threats had been reported. When they reported incidents, some candidates found police lacked the expertise to handle their complaint, with some allegedly dismissing harassment claims inappropriately as 'freedom of expression'.
• While robust debate is fundamental, abuse should never be seen as a normal part of the democratic process. We will work with police and Government to ensure that all involved treat allegations and cases of election-related intimidation seriously and demonstrate that those committing offences against candidates and campaigners will face significant sanctions.

The Government and the Electoral Commission should investigate reforms to the system for candidate registration so that candidates and agents are asked to provide an email address at registration which can be shared with the Electoral Commission and the police. This will allow the Electoral Commission and the police to send security guidance directly to all candidates.

While these reforms are being considered and implemented, the Electoral Commission should provide guidance to returning officers to signpost every candidate to the single source hosting security-related guidance and advice, as well as relevant local security information, at the point they register. (Paragraph 48)

Our response

• We agree. Ahead of the 2026 elections, we are requesting candidates’ contact details as part of nomination packs, and will pass these on to police. This will allow police forces to share essential information with candidates in an emergency. We have provided guidance to Returning Officers (ROs) to make clear they are allowed to share contact details with the police and should do so as soon as possible after the close of nominations.
• Investigating cases of abuse should remain led by the police, since they hold enforcement and prosecution powers that ROs do not. We recognise that, given the complexity of the electoral landscape and the range of players involved, we have a role to play to support ROs and candidates, by providing guidance, and signposting relevant support.
• Candidates receive security advice from their Force Elected-Official Advisor (FEOA) and specific information on local election management from their local RO. A centralised list of candidates with contact details, such as an email address, would make it easier for police to contact candidates directly. Legislative change may be needed for it to become mandatory for candidates to provide an email address at registration to be shared with the police, as this is currently optional.

The Electoral Commission should produce a code of practice for election officials, drawing together all the necessary information related to the safety and security of candidates. (Paragraph 56)

Our response

• We welcome this recommendation. We produce core guidance to Returning Officers (ROs) on the safe and effective management of all parts of the electoral process. We recently updated the guidance on how best to manage attendees at elections, drawing together all the necessary information related to the safety and security of candidates. This includes strengthened guidance on ROs’ powers to remove individuals from events when appropriate and around managing behaviours, such as around the use of mobile phones in polling stations and counts, including the filming of proceedings. This will support ROs to manage disruption at electoral events, such as counts, and better protect voters and campaigners from potential abuse.
• We engage closely and regularly with ROs to ensure they are aware of the latest good practice and guidance. This ongoing engagement, guidance and tailored support, underpinned by the agreed principles of our performance standards for ROs, already fulfil the aims of the recommendation here.
• The UK Government has also said it will develop clearer guidance on the application of election, online safety and public order legislation, to be shared with the police, Returning Officers and candidates. Police and RO responsibilities with respect to ensuring polling station security should be made clear, to avoid potential confusion. Polling station security and maintaining public order should remain police-led since they hold enforcement powers, with ROs supported to have clarity about the extent and limits of their responsibilities and jurisdiction. Clearer guidance from Government will help establish the roles and responsibilities of each of the players involved, ensuring more co-ordinated responses from police, administrators and candidates themselves.

The Government must undertake a full review of electoral law with the intention of identifying:

• offences that require clarification through legislative change or further guidance;
• gaps in the powers of returning officers to ensure the effective administration of elections in the context of situations relating to harassment, abuse and intimidation; and
• administrative practices or processes that unintentionally undermine security or electoral integrity. (Paragraph 69)

Our response

• Following the Speaker’s Conference report, the UK Government has commissioned a review of electoral law in its election strategy to identify whether there are vulnerabilities and legislative gaps in the powers the police have, considering whether electoral law is sufficient to protect our national security, and finding ways to support the consistency of police responses to these issues across the UK. The Defending Democracy Taskforce will carry out this review, alongside the Commission, and other government departments.
• A review of electoral law will provide an up-to-date assessment of the existing risks and help future proof our democracy against threats. We recommend that it forms part of a wider project to consolidate, modernise and simplify our overly complicated and outdated electoral law, in order to address wider threats facing the electoral system.
• Many of the offences relating to intimidation and harassment are contained within the Representation of the People Act 1983, which does not define key terms, and is based on campaigning practices from 40 years ago. A comprehensive review of the law to identify and address gaps like these would help address this issue and make the law easier to understand and follow.

The Department for Education’s Curriculum and Assessment Review should ensure that the National Curriculum includes a comprehensive programme of citizenship education from KS1 to post-16. Citizenship education needs to start in earnest in primary schools, so that healthy attitudes towards democratic structures and processes are embedded early on.

Teachers must receive appropriate training to deliver citizenship education confidently and impartially, and it must be implemented as an integral part of any proposals to lower the voting age to 16.

We invite the devolved Administrations to consider what, if any, changes can be made to citizenship education in the Welsh, Scottish and Northern Irish curricula to ensure they also deliver the knowledge, skills and understanding outlined above. (Paragraph 30)

Our response

• We strongly share the view that education must play a part in tackling abuse, and that citizenship education should be reformed in order to adequately prepare young people to participate in our democracy.
• Evidence shows us that the earlier a young person starts democratic education, the more positive the civic and political participation outcomes they experience. We recommended democratic education start at primary level in our submission to the Curriculum and Assessment Review. In the lead up to the curriculum’s publication in 2027, we will work with the Department for Education, schools and partner organisations to enhance citizenship education. We have also contributed to the curriculum review consultation in Northern Ireland and are working closely with Education Scotland to ensure its reform plans respond to the needs of young voters. We are monitoring the impact of the changes to the curriculum in Wales to ensure it delivers the knowledge, skills and understanding of democracy that young people need in order to participate fully.
• Ahead of elections in May, we will pilot new education resources and projects in formal and informal education settings - from primary to post-16 - to understand which approaches are delivering positive outcomes for young people. We will use this to develop a democratic education framework that supports schools to prepare students to cast their vote, using the insights gained to contribute to the wider evidence base for implementing votes at 16.
• Our framework will build young people's knowledge and confidence before they cast their first vote. This will include a focus on developing oracy skills to help young people disagree respectfully and argue robustly, media literacy skills to critically engage with political information online, and an understanding of the role of politicians, providing opportunities to connect positively with them. We are also working with partners to include examples of threats to female MPs as part of the Government’s strategy to tackle violence against women and girls through education.
• Our resources for teachers will provide guidance on how to deliver lessons in an engaging and impartial way. Teachers have told us they lack confidence in delivering impartial democratic education lessons, with only 78% describing themselves as at least ‘somewhat confident’ in leading an impartial lesson on democracy and elections. It is essential that teachers trust the material provided, so we'll continue to work with them, alongside parties and other stakeholders, as we develop our impartiality framework.

MPs should actively engage with young people in their local areas to support citizenship education. To help them to do this effectively, Parliament’s Education and Engagement Team should expand its offer to MPs to include resources for presentations and practical workshops that are designed by educators with expertise in working with different age-ranges. Parliament’s Education and Engagement Team should also extend the training and guidance on working with children that is currently offered to Members of the House of Lords to any MPs who want to take part. The House of Commons should make available the resources to cover this expansion, based on an assessment of anticipated uptake among MPs. (Paragraph 33)

We encourage MPs to engage with students in their constituency. UK Parliament Week presents a good opportunity for them to visit schools. The Education and Engagement Team should help to facilitate these visits, working with MPs and managing the administrative tasks to enable them to meet as many students as possible. (Paragraph 34)

Our response

• Research suggests that positive political contact between young people and politicians increases satisfaction and improves trust in politics. In the last year, we launched a programme of MP school visits. This is part of our strategy to improve democratic education and increase young people’s participation in elections and strengthen their confidence in the political system.
• Through these MP visits, we aim to teach young people about their vote, voter registration and the roles and responsibilities of MPs. Our experience of facilitating visits is that they are engaging and useful for young people, helpful and enjoyable for politicians, and can be done in an appropriate non-partisan way. On average, 58% of the students that participate in a workshop with an MP understand more about politics and democracy and 62% feel more confident to register to vote.
• As part of our strategy to support young people voting, we have continued to run  ‘Welcome to Your Vote Week’, which aims to raise awareness of upcoming elections and support first time voting. In 2025 we supported more than half a million young people and nearly 5,000 educators to learn about democracy and voting.

We therefore recommend that the Government’s Defending Democracy Taskforce commission research to understand the identities and motivations of perpetrators of abuse and intimidation of MPs and candidates (from those engaging in repetitive ‘low level’ abusive behaviours and communications to those committing criminal offences), and the most effective ways to engage with them and deter them from this behaviour. (Paragraph 44)

Our response

• Further research into the identities and motivations of perpetrators of abuse will allow for better, more tailored responses to address the issue of abuse and intimidation.
• We have carried out research into the prevalence of abuse experienced by candidates, and are carrying out further research with the public to develop a clearer understanding of where they consider the threshold lies between acceptable and unacceptable behaviour. This can be used to inform future steps relating to policing, campaign behaviour and public education on respectful debate, and treatment of campaigners and elected representatives. We will also continue to survey candidates after every election, to understand their experiences of abuse, and what actions they think should be taken.

In line with our previous recommendation, elections law policing should, in future, be brought within the remit of the anti-democratic crimes unit. Until then, current arrangements for ensuring each police force has electoral law expertise are still very necessary. However, candidates are now far more likely to be affected by abuse and intimidation than elections law crimes. The expertise of their named point of contact should reflect this. We therefore recommend that Op Bridger leads and Force Elected Official Advisers (FEOAs) should be candidates’ named points of contact. The elections single points of contact (SPOCs) should understand the issue of harassment at elections and how to refer anyone affected by it to the Op Bridger lead or FEOA. The NPCC should ensure that the Op Bridger leads, FEOAs and elections single points of contact are joined up and share knowledge and intelligence, at both local force and national leadership levels. (Paragraph 106)

Our response

• It is vital that each police force has electoral law expertise in order to properly address electoral offences, including those relating to fraud (which are handled by election fraud Single Points of Contact (SPOCs)), and abuse (which are handled by local Force Elected-Official Advisors (FEOAs) and Bridger SPOCs). This helps to ensure that allegations of abuse and fraud are properly dealt with by officers with appropriate expertise, and candidates receive adequate and consistent support.
• Electoral law is highly complex, so in some cases, it may not be appropriate for one officer to hold responsibility as the candidate point of contact for concerns regarding both fraud and abuse.
• The current system, which includes multiple police operations (Bridger and Ford in the UK, and Sandbed for MSPs) and specialised roles (SPOCs and FEOAs) can be complicated for candidates to navigate. Candidates need clear information and guidance about how to access support for both kinds of offence. Police forces should contact candidates at the start of an election, to make clear the relevant contacts they should use for both kinds of offence – be that one point of contact or more than one.
• To help candidates ahead of May, we will be publishing information online, directing candidates to the support and resources they need if they experience abuse, including signposting to support from the police where appropriate.

Our first report said we would consider the merits or otherwise of a) a specific offence against MPs and b) an aggravating factor applicable to sentencing for crimes committed against candidates or MPs because of their role. It is clear that there is a case for a specific aggravating factor and that this has advantages over a specific offence because it would be better able to take account of the various ways people may try to intimidate a politician.

We therefore welcome the Government’s decision to introduce a new statutory aggravating factor for offences motivated by hostility towards candidates, campaigners, elected representatives, or electoral staff. The Government should ensure this can be applied broadly, including covering crimes that are motivated   by hostility to elected officials but directed against their staff and representatives, who are often on the front line of abuse and intimidation of MPs. To this end, we recommend the Government bring forward legislative proposals, at the earliest opportunity, that reflect the elements and spirit of the draft legislative provisions we have included at Annex 3. Governments of the devolved nations should take steps to reflect this change in their own legislation. (Paragraph 132-33)

Our response

• We also welcome the UK Government’s decision to introduce a statutory aggravating factor for offences motivated by hostility towards candidates, campaigners, elected representatives, or electoral staff, following recommendations in the first Speaker’s Conference report.
• An aggravating factor will help to address the growing problem of candidate security, by enabling increased sentences to both punish offenders and deter future would-be offenders from engaging in intimidation. It will mean that when prosecuting offenders of abuse, courts will have to take the aggravation into account when determining the appropriate sentence – reflecting the seriousness of the offence, and the wider impact abuse has on democracy as a whole. This also helps address the perception among the police that abuse is something they can’t get involved with due to concerns around freedom of speech.
• Including offences against electoral staff would extend the protections to a group who are central to delivering elections and have also faced unacceptable abuse, intimidation and harassment. Such a change would also bring reserved elections into alignment with devolved elections in Scotland, where an aggravating factor has recently come into force for offences motivated by hostility towards electoral staff.

Before the Government carries out the review we have recommended of the effectiveness of disqualification orders, it should take immediate measures to ensure they are actually being used. The Crown Prosecution Service should instruct prosecutors to inform courts of their powers to use a disqualification order whenever relevant. The Sentencing Council, Scottish Sentencing Council and Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland should ensure that judges are aware of these orders, by updating sentencing guidelines, guideline judgements or guidance as appropriate. The Government should confirm in its response to this report that these steps have been completed or action taken to complete them within the next year. (Paragraph 141)

Our response

• The 2024 general election was the first general election in which disqualification orders, introduced in the Elections Act 2022 were in place.
• The UK Government has indicated that it intends to extend the disqualification order to cover offences against electoral staff. Currently, these orders only cover offences against candidates, campaigners and elected officeholders. Extending these will help to protect staff from abuse and make polling stations more secure.
• We agree that the UK Government should review the effectiveness of disqualification orders, to ensure police, prosecutors and the judiciary understand, use, and apply them consistently, however we do not think a review should delay disqualification orders being extended.

The statutory requirement for platforms to remove illegal content covers threats against MPs, candidates and other public figures, just as much as anyone else. In order to ensure that these threats are properly dealt with, Ofcom should pay particular attention to whether platforms’ content moderation procedures introduce additional criteria relating to the removal of illegal content related to public figures when it reviews them under the Online Safety Act 2023. They should specifically consider whether these additional criteria breach provisions of the Act around requirements for systems to remove illegal content and to enforce the platform’s policies consistently. The Government should review the USUK Data Access Agreement in consultation with the police to establish whether it is effective in granting police the access to information they need from social media platforms about criminal activities.

It is also important that, while abusive content remains on a platform, it is not promoted to other users, which can increase the harm to the victim and run the risk of triggering further abuse. The best defence against this is careful scrutiny of the platforms’ recommendation algorithms by researchers and Ofcom. The Government should design and implement an access to data regime that delivers maximum transparency around platforms’ operations. (Paragraph 190-191)

Ofcom must be given time to fully implement the Online Safety Act, in line with the recommendations made above. However, given how central social media is to the issue of threats against MPs and candidates, as well as so many areas of public and private life, it is unlikely that this is the last legislation Government will need to pass on social media regulation. Given the exceptionally complex, technical and politically charged nature of this topic, preparations should be made ahead of time so that options for further regulation are ready for the Government to act on when needed.

These preparations should take account of the fact that political discourse online drives more abuse than other topics and should therefore include consideration of what additional protections platforms may need to put in place around political discussions. These may include prohibiting platforms from having different standards for removing threats against politicians and other public figures, or requiring the introduction of automated prompts like those we called for above, to warn users if they are about to post content that may be abusive, or to encourage them to engage appropriately when contacting an elected representative.

Noting that elections are high risk periods for abuse and given the significance and authority of codes of practice within the structures of the Online Safety Act, the Government should consider the merits of mandating Ofcom to produce an elections code of practice for social media platforms, and the feasibility of introducing this requirement as part of the Bill it has said it will bring forward during this Parliament on electoral reform. (Paragraph 204-206)

The Conference’s first report noted issues with the enforcement of section 106 of the Representation of the People Act 1983 and recommended the Government review how to make the intention behind it enforceable. False statements of this kind are a particular concern when shared online: we therefore recommend that the Government give appropriate consideration to how any updated legislation can be enforced against online disinformation. As part of this work, and in order to ensure the same issues with enforcement are not repeated, the Government should review the enforcement and effectiveness of the false communications offence introduced by the Online Safety Act 2023.

In line with the recommendation in our first report, and in order to address the terrible spread of sexually explicit deepfakes targeting female candidates, the Government should ensure that current legislation and any amended legislation on false statements about candidates explicitly cover the creation of deepfakes. (Paragraph 213)

Our response

• Social media and digital platforms have become key tools for campaigners to engage with voters, but growing evidence shows that candidates and voters increasingly face abuse and intimidation when using these platforms. We welcome this Conference’s calls to the Government to compel platforms to address harmful content on their sites. Platforms should do more to put in place standardised, rapid-response protocols to remove abusive content and identify perpetrators.
• The Online Safety Act currently requires large platforms to protect content of democratic importance when applying content moderation. We recommend the Government considers creating a clearer new overarching duty on platforms operating in the UK to cover a wider range of risks to elections, to ensure they take action to mitigate risks and protect legitimate political debate, particularly during critical election periods. This would help provide clarity and a shared understanding of what actions are needed by platforms during elections and provide a clearer basis for Ofcom to take enforcement action if appropriate actions are not taken.
• There must not be a higher tolerance for illegal content directed against politicians and public figures compared with others. Our upcoming research (highlighted above) will help provide further evidence about voters’ views on the threshold between acceptable and unacceptable behaviour, which could be used to benchmark the effectiveness of moderation policies.
• The Scottish Parliament has developed a pilot scheme to protect elected representatives from online abuse by using targeted keywords and location data to identify potentially abusive content. The pilot has shown promising results, and we are considering with partners how this might be scaled up across the UK. We are also launching a pilot ahead of the May elections to test a deepfake detection tool, focusing on misleading content about the electoral process. The pilot will assess whether suspected videos are deepfakes, analyse their impact on public sentiment, track trends, and inform appropriate regulatory or enforcement action with partners such as Ofcom or the police.
• We continue to meet regularly with Ofcom, including co-ordinating a forum with it and other regulators, working together and responding to shared challenges around elections.