Report on the 2024 UK Parliamentary general election and the May 2024 elections

Voting at the elections summary

The experience of voting at the 2024 UK Parliamentary general election

  • Public confidence in how elections are run remains high and most people are satisfied with the registration and voting processes. However, some groups of people are less likely to have a positive view of the election, including younger people, people from ethnic minority backgrounds, disabled people, and people in the C2DE social grade.
  • Turnout fell significantly at this election to 60.0%, down from 67.5% in 2019. While this can be due to several factors, we continue to find that negative perceptions of party politics and politicians contribute to people’s decisions not to vote.
  • Most people found it easy to vote in person or by post, but a small number of voters told us they needed help to fill in their ballot paper.

Read more about voting at the elections

Barriers to voting at the elections summary

Some voters experienced specific challenges when voting at the 2024 UK Parliamentary general election

  • More can be done to improve awareness of the support available for voters in polling stations. Although Returning Officers provided a range of accessibility equipment and support at polling stations, many people were not aware of the assistance available to them. This included the equipment that should be provided, as well as the help and support available from staff and companions.
  • More than 1.3 million people applied to vote by post after the UK general election was announced, and this was the first UK general election at which people could apply online. However, some postal voters did not receive their ballot packs in time to complete and return them before polling day. Although these problems were not systemic, postal voting systems did not work well enough for some voters and should be improved.
  • British and eligible Irish citizens who had lived overseas for more than 15 years could vote for the first time at the UK general election. However, the options for voting by overseas citizens do not work well enough and are in need of fundamental improvement.

Read more about barriers to voting at the elections

Campaigning at the elections summary

The experience of campaigning at the 2024 UK Parliamentary general election

  • A record number of candidates stood at the UK general election. Despite the timing of the election, there was a robust and vibrant political debate, with campaigners engaging in a range of activities and voters being able to hear from a wide array of views.
  • However, many candidates experienced unacceptable levels of intimidation and harassment, in particular directed at women and candidates from ethnic minority backgrounds. Over half of candidates responding to our survey said they avoided some form of campaigning because of fear of abuse.
  • Abuse and intimidation risk putting off people wanting to stand for election, and can prevent voters being able to hear from candidates directly. We will work with partners across the wider electoral community to understand what is driving abuse and intimidation, and to collectively develop effective responses to tackle these problems.
  • This was the first UK general election at which the digital imprints requirements applied. Candidates told us that they understood the requirement to include digital imprints and found it easy to comply with.
  • The election presented new challenges to the nominations system, with reports of alleged fake candidates and multiple candidates of the same name. The requirements and checks for nominating candidates should be strengthened to make it harder for candidates to mislead voters about their true identity.

Read more about campaigning at the elections

Delivering the elections summary

The experience of electoral administration at the 2024 UK Parliamentary general election

  • Electoral administrators were able to deliver well-run elections in challenging circumstances. However, there were new layers of risk and complexity added to an already stretched process. This included the timing of the UK general election, several new legislative changes, and new parliamentary boundaries.
  • Local authority resilience is reliant on a complex and fragmented funding framework and underpinned by an outdated and increasingly complex system of electoral law. The challenges to the resilience of the electoral system – including funding – need to be addressed.
  • The capacity and resilience of suppliers remain a key concern for electoral administrators. To continue to deliver well-run elections that meet voters’ expectations, they need to rely on fully functional, joined up digital systems. This includes electoral management software and the digital systems that the UK Government provides.

Read more about delivering the elections

Local elections in England, while always recording lower levels of participation than UK general elections, have seen a similar long-term decline. In the 1980s and early 1990s overall turnout in English local elections was between 40% and 50%. In recent years it is more common to see levels below 35%.

Negative perceptions can lead people not to vote

We know from our research that some people choose not to vote or are unable to because of circumstantial reasons, including medical reasons, being too busy, on holiday, or away for work. However, we also consistently find that negative perceptions of party politics and politicians contribute to people’s decisions not to vote. This includes a general lack of interest, the view that all parties are ‘the same’, a feeling that no party or candidate represented ‘their views’, and an absence of trust in politicians.

Falling levels of participation are concerning. They have the potential to negatively affect the public’s trust in elections. It is particularly important that newly enfranchised voters choose to vote when they become eligible. Research has found that voting is a habit. When people do not begin to vote early in life, they are less likely to do so later.

Addressing this challenge is not straightforward. We believe an important part of the response is ensuring young people get high quality education about democracy and elections whether through schools, clubs or other relevant organisations.

Some people had help when voting

There was a small number of voters who said they needed help to fill in their ballot paper – 3% of those who voted in person and 3% of those who voted by post. In both cases, young people were more likely than older people to say they had help. Among in-person voters, disabled people who are ‘limited a lot’ by their disability or health condition, and people from ethnic minority backgrounds were also more likely to say they had help.

We asked these voters to choose the main reason someone helped them to vote. For postal voters, the main reason given related to the difficulty in following the instructions for completion. For in-person voters, responses were more evenly distributed although a quarter said it was related to a disability or health condition.

Table 1: Reasons given by the 3% of voters who said they had help when voting
Main reason for having helpIn-person voters who had helpPostal voters who had help
I have a disability or health condition24%27%
I did not know who to vote for and asked someone to help me20%10%
Another adult insisted on helping me choose who to vote for20%9%
I took a child under 18 with me and they came into the polling booth14%N/A
The instructions were difficult to understandN/A43%
Another reason22%11%

Among both postal and in-person voters, some said that another adult had insisted on helping them choose who to vote for. We cannot judge from this data the degree to which the voter did not want help or the extent of any input from another person. However, it is possible that some of these instances involved assistance that the voter did not want or which they found coercive.

On polling day in both May and July, Electoral Commission representatives visited polling stations and observed a small number of instances where someone attempted to go into the polling booth with another voter. We also saw polling station staff stopping this happening, although the response was not uniform across all polling stations. Other accredited observer organisations, such as Democracy Volunteers and the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, also reported on instances in polling stations where the secrecy of the ballot requirement may not have been met.

The proportions involved here are small. Only 3% of voters overall told us they had assistance, and most of that help was sought for a specific reason. However, it is essential that all voters can vote without coercion or pressure. We will continue to provide information for voters about their rights. We will also ensure polling station staff have guidance that supports them to protect the secrecy of voting in polling stations. This includes knowing when and how to challenge behaviour which may breach the secrecy of the ballot, and to report allegations of potential offences under existing electoral law to the police.

Recommendation 1: Awareness of the accessibility support available at the polling station should be increased

More can be done to improve awareness of the support available for voters in polling stations.

Online and offline information should explain the support available to voters. This includes making clear what support voters can expect in polling stations, and how they can request additional equipment or support.

This information should be provided on poll cards and local authority websites in a timely manner in advance of the election. It should also be provided to voters in polling stations. We will look at whether our guidance for Returning Officers needs to be more specific or clearer about how to provide this information.

We will also look at whether the Election Information tool we run with Democracy Club could be used to provide information for voters about the support they can access at their own local polling station.

We will continue to raise awareness among voters. This includes working with the UK’s governments, local authorities, charity and civil society organisations. We will also work with local and national media to get the word out about the support available. We will identify and share examples of good practice and relevant learning.

The Scottish and Welsh governments are intending to introduce new legislation so more support is provided at devolved elections in Scotland and Wales. We will work with officials, administrators and civil society organisations to support them to make sure those changes work for voters.

Some voters may have expected postal votes to arrive earlier

The timing of the election during the summer holiday period meant that some people may have applied for a postal vote because they knew they were going to be away on polling day. It is not uncommon for postal ballot packs to arrive shortly before polling day.

However, many voters may have been unaware of this and expected to receive them in time to vote before they went on holiday. Some voters may also have been unaware of the option of voting by proxy or may not have had someone who could act as a proxy for them on polling day.

While simplifying the process for voters, the ability to apply online for an absent vote, rather than by completing a paper form or contacting their local registration office, may have made it less likely that voters knew about the expected timing of postal vote delivery and the different voting options available to them (including by proxy).

Postal ballot packs are not processed and issued ‘on demand’. They are processed, printed and dispatched in batches. At the 2024 UK general election: 

  • The first issue of postal votes occurred shortly after the close of nominations deadline on 7 June. People who already had a postal vote, or applied for one before 7 June, would have received their postal vote in this first round of dispatches 
  • People who applied shortly before the deadline to register for a postal vote were expected to receive their postal ballot pack as part of a second dispatch

Unlike other statutory processes, the deadlines for processing and issuing postal ballot packs are not set out in the legislation. However, there are several statutory deadlines which electoral administrators must take into account when planning:

  • Close of candidate nominations, 19 working days before polling day. Ballot papers cannot be printed before this deadline
  • Register to vote, 12 working days before polling day 
  • Applications to vote by post or proxy (GB only), 11 and six working days before polling day respectively 
  • Applications to vote by post or proxy (NI), 14 working days before polling day 
  • Applications for a replacement for lost postal votes, four working days before polling day. Prior to this, electoral administrators cannot reissue postal ballot packs to voters.

There is a limited timeframe within the election timetable for electoral administrators to process and issue postal ballot packs.

In Scotland, the convener of the Electoral Management Board for Scotland issued a set of recommendations ahead of the election to support Electoral Registration Officers and Returning Officers to promote consistency and to support effective contingency measures. This included recommending specific dates for the first issue of poll cards and postal votes.

Large numbers of applications added pressure to the system close to the deadline

In addition to the timing challenges, there were 1.3 million applications for postal votes in Great Britain between the election being called on 22 May and the deadline on 19 June. This includes nearly 470,000 applications from 14 June onwards, when existing postal voters were starting to receive their postal ballot packs.

Data is not available on the volumes of applications received ahead of previous UK general elections, but two factors suggest that the number of later applications was higher at this election:

  • The ability to apply online is likely to have increased the number of applications received close to the deadline (as it has done with applications to register to vote)
  • The timing of the election during the summer holiday period in Scotland and Northern Ireland meant that some people, who may have preferred to vote in person, would have been away on polling day and would have chosen to vote by post.

Postal votes need to be sent to electors and then returned. The more applications which are processed closer to polling day, the more postal votes will arrive with voters close to polling day and the greater the risk of delays in dispatch meaning some people are unable to vote.

In Northern Ireland, there was an increase in the number of postal vote applications, mainly attributed to the election coinciding with the school holidays. However, there did not appear to be significant issues for postal voters. This is probably because postal voting on demand is not available in Northern Ireland, there is an earlier deadline for applying for an absent vote, and because the Electoral Office of Northern Ireland processed applications on a daily basis, rather than in batches.

People in Northern Ireland must provide a Digital Registration Number (DRN) to apply for an absent vote. Our previous research found that the DRN posed a barrier to voters, given the volume of postal and proxy applications rejected due to a missing DRN. For the first time at the UK general election, the Electoral Office for Northern Ireland offered an online look-up tool where voters could check if they were registered to vote and obtain their DRN.  There was a notable decline in the number of applications rejected for not including a DRN at the UK general election, which suggests this service was effective.

Some areas had problems with suppliers printing and dispatching postal ballot packs

With administrators working to demanding deadlines, it was crucial that they could rely on the external suppliers delivering print services. However, in Scotland specifically there were problems with supplier capacity to produce the required volumes in the time available. The election timetable is shorter for a UK general election (25 working days) than at devolved elections in Scotland (35 working days). Unlike for Scottish Parliament elections, the date of the UK general election is not fixed and this year coincided with the school holiday period. This led to an increased demand for postal voting in Scotland and exacerbated problems with capacity.

For example, in some areas, only around 50% of postal ballot packs were issued within the timeframes recommended by the EMB for the first batch of postal votes (18-19 June). This delay was understood to be partly due to a production breakdown. The second dispatch of postal ballot packs was also subject to delays in some areas. All of this was due to several factors, including the volume of later applications, production breakdowns, and timescales.

Because of the delayed delivery some postal voters experienced, some councils in Scotland set up emergency drop-in facilities for voters to obtain a replacement postal vote pack.

Overall postal voter turnout remained high

Despite the issues faced by some voters, turnout among postal voters remained high although, as with overall turnout, it dropped in comparison to 2019 (80.7% of postal votes returned in 2024 compared to 83.9% in 2019). Although it is clear that some voters faced problems when trying to vote, there is no evidence of a widespread impact on turnout in Scotland in particular, where the drop in the proportion of postal votes returned was smaller than in many other areas.

Recommendation 2: Postal voting systems should be reformed to improve the service for voters and strengthen resilience

Postal voting systems did not work well enough for some voters this year. This meant that they did not receive their postal votes in time to complete and return them before polling day.

In a limited number of areas, this was because of errors or problems with suppliers. In other cases, voters did not understand when they should expect to receive their postal votes. This meant that they were not able to choose a different way of voting that would better suit their circumstances.

The system of absent voting (including postal voting and voting by proxy) should be reformed to improve the service for voters and strengthen resilience for future elections.

Key areas for potential reform and improvement include:

  • Improving the information that is given to voters before and after they apply to vote by post – so that they understand when they should expect to receive their postal vote, and can decide if they need to choose a different way of voting 
  • Considering whether the current deadline for postal vote applications allows enough time to process applications and issue postal votes so that voters can complete and return them before polling day
  • More flexible rules for reissuing postal votes to voters who have not received theirs, so that they can be sent out sooner than the current deadline of four days before polling day
  • Allowing postal voters to cancel their postal vote or appoint a proxy to vote on their behalf instead, if they have not received their postal vote in time to complete and return it before polling day
  • Exploring whether other forms of voting before polling day could give voters better alternatives to postal or proxy voting – this could include early voting or other forms of flexible voting
  • Considering whether the funding available to pay for postal votes to be printed and issued is enough to meet increasing demand, and improving the contractual and supplier base to provide the level of service that voters expect.

These reforms may need changes to legislation or funding. The UK’s governments and others across the electoral sector should develop solutions. Drawing on this evidence base, we will work to identify effective solutions and ensure any changes improve accessibility, are workable in practice, and are clearly communicated to voters, campaigners, and electoral administrators.

While Returning Officers and suppliers prioritised overseas electors’ postal votes, dispatching them as early as possible, this was only possible for overseas electors who were already registered for a postal vote. Those who applied after the election was called would have been unlikely to have their applications processed in time for inclusion in the first batch.

The overseas voter’s country of residence is also a factor in how likely a vote is to be returned in time to be counted. This is partly because ballots take longer to arrive in and be returned from different countries. This results in different return rates across our sampled local authorities.

Table 3: Overseas postal votes sent and returned by destination country
CountryNumber sentNumber received in time to be countedReturn rate (%)
Australia559316%
Canada26512848%
France95671275%
Germany46024052%
Singapore1597044%
Spain41813532%
USA91034238%

This data also suggests that distance is not the only factor affecting return rates. For example, the return rate from Spain is low compared to more distant destinations such as Canada, Singapore and the USA. This does not appear to be because the postal ballot packs going to Spain happened to be in later despatches. For example, based only on the first run of postal votes issued across the sample of local authorities, the return rate from Spain was 47% compared to 88% from France.

Overseas voters do not think the system works for them

After the election, we asked overseas voters about their experience of the election.1  We asked respondents if they were satisfied with the process of voting at the election – 46% told us they were satisfied, with 51% saying they were not.

Overseas voters reported dissatisfaction with the time available for receiving and returning their postal vote.

“Unfortunately, I never got to cast my vote as my voting pack was not dispatched until 24 June even though I had submitted my application on the 6th. It typically takes 6–8 days for regular mail to reach the U.S., and so, as predicted, my voting pack only arrived on 3 July, the day before the election. This meant that it was impossible for me to return my ballot paper in time even using the fastest courier service. I would have needed two days at the very minimum.” 

“The ballot paper arrived three days before polling day and I live in Ireland. There was no way it would have got back to London by post other than by sending it recorded delivery on a two day service which costs a lot.”

Voting by proxy was viewed as unsuitable for some people as a voter needs to have someone who they trust in the UK and who they can appoint as their proxy.

“I did not know anybody who I could appoint as a proxy to vote on my behalf so a postal vote was the only option.”

“Proxy voting only works efficiently if you have someone you trust in the constituency to be able to vote on your behalf. Without that, you either have to postal vote, travel to vote in-person, or do a proxy postal vote – the latter is incredibly complicated and risks further delays. I was lucky this time because I had a trustworthy partner to act as a proxy, but that may not always be possible.”

Recommendation 3: Overseas voters need better systems to ensure their votes can be counted

The options for voting by British and eligible Irish citizens overseas do not work well enough. There is not enough time for many overseas voters to receive and return a postal vote in time to be counted. Some overseas voters do not know anyone in the UK that they can appoint as a proxy to vote on their behalf instead of relying on postal voting.

The systems of voting for overseas voters should be reformed to improve the service so that their votes can be counted. The UK can learn from the experiences of other countries that provide different ways of supporting their citizens overseas to vote in elections, including Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States.

Key areas for potential reform and improvement include:

  • Considering whether the current deadline for registering as an overseas voter allows enough time to process applications and issue postal votes for overseas voters to complete and return them before polling day
  • Considering whether postal voting should be the default option for all overseas voters when they register (unless they choose to vote in person or appoint a proxy) – so that more postal votes can be issued at the earliest possible point in the timetable
  • Exploring how to send postal votes to overseas voters earlier in the election timetable – for example by sending a blank ballot paper before the candidate nomination deadline has passed, or allowing voters to securely download and print their own ballot paper, then post it (rather than relying on post arriving from the UK)
  • Exploring whether some overseas voters could vote in person at an embassy or consulate in the country where they live, instead of relying on postal voting
  • Exploring whether telephone-based assisted voting, as used in Queensland Australia, could be made available to overseas voters who cannot rely on the postal service.

These reforms may need changes to legislation or funding. The UK Government and others across the electoral sector should develop solutions. Drawing on this evidence base, we will work to identify effective solutions and ensure any changes improve accessibility for voters and are workable in practice.

We showed respondents a list of scenarios of abuse or harassment, including social media abuse, physical abuse, and threatening behaviour, and asked how often they had experienced them:

  • Overall, 70% of respondents experienced one of the scenarios at least once during the UK general election campaign, with a quarter (26%) of candidates experiencing four different types of harassment, intimidation or abuse at least once 
  • A third of respondents were intimidated or intentionally made to feel unsafe at least once during their campaign. The same proportion had their campaign assets torn down or destroyed, while 30% had their property or campaign assets defaced or damaged.

During the campaign, we received reports of abusive and intimidatory campaign material, both online and in print, that did not include an imprint. This made it harder to identify the sources of the harassment.

Abuse and intimidation can have a significant impact on candidates’ campaign activity. The majority (56%) of respondents said they avoided some form of campaign activity at least once due to a fear of abuse:

  • The activity candidates avoided doing the most was campaigning on their own. 44% of respondents said that they avoided doing so at least once. This rises to 66% of female respondents 
  • One third (32%) of respondents said they had avoided talking about or giving their opinions on controversial topics to avoid harassment 
  • Around one in five avoided using social media (23%), putting up campaign materials (20%), and attending face-to-face campaign activities (17%) at least once.

Some groups of candidates were more likely to experience abuse and intimidation

Female respondents and respondents from ethnic minority backgrounds were more likely to report having experienced serious abuse.

When choosing from the examples of the intimidation experienced, female respondents to our survey were more likely than male candidates to report being touched, hugged, or kissed against their will.

In follow-up interviews, we spoke to four female candidates and received written evidence from others, including MPs and political parties, about their experiences of abuse. There was a clear feeling that the abuse and harassment they received during the campaign was targeted at them because of their gender, and that they received more abuse than men.

“When I was going around knocking on doors, I had really abusive males. They were just full-on, in your face saying [my party] was a load of crap and politics was wrong and they were swearing at you and, you know, it was really unpleasant. […] I just stopped knocking on the doors and just leafleted in the end. My husband did most of the door knocking for me instead because being a male he had a better rapport. But I still think that it's incredibly sad because they obviously don't respond to a female wanting to put themselves forward.” - Female, England, 45-54; Received damage and destruction of campaign materials, social media abuse, and intimidatory behaviour

“I don't know how you address it. I don't know what the root cause of it is. I think the women bear the brunt of this because we're perceived as an easier target to convince not to [run].” - Female, England, 45-54; Received threats of harm, intimidatory behaviour, damage and destruction of campaign materials, social media abuse, and was touched against her will

Respondents from ethnic minority backgrounds were more likely than any other demographic groups to say they experienced each of the intimidation scenarios we presented to respondents (apart from being touched, hugged, or kissed against their will). 

They were also more likely to have:

  • Received offensive social media posts about their ethnicity (55%) or religion (41%) than all respondents (15% and 10% respectively) 
  • Been intimidated or intentionally made to feel unsafe (58%) than women (39%), white respondents (32%) and men (31%).

Disabled respondents were twice as likely to have been physically attacked, hit, or had something thrown at them compared to respondents without a disability (10% versus 5%). They were also slightly more likely to have received social media abuse than those without a disability (60% compared with 51%).

Cases of abuse and intimidation sometimes go unreported

Only one in five (21%) of the respondents who told us they received abuse, harassment or intimidation reported it to the police.

The most common reason given for not reporting abuse was that candidates felt it was too low-level or was not serious enough to be worth reporting. Others said that they did not report it because they felt there was no point or that nothing would be done as a result.

“It was sufficiently minor to be annoying and hurtful rather than intimidating or threatening.” - Male, Northern Ireland, 55-64; Received social media abuse

“It was only on Twitter and there is no point. There is also no point in reporting it to Twitter because it never meets their thresholds for action anymore.” - Female, Scotland, 35-44; Received social media abuse

“[Abuse is] basically considered normal and I doubt anything would be done about it.” - Female, England, 45-54; Received social media abuse and was belittled or insulted

When instances of abuse and intimidation were reported to the police, candidates reported mixed experiences with the response they received. When it came to dealing with reports of intimidation and abuse from candidates, our survey of single points of contact (SPOC) officers in police forces, who are responsible for providing advice about election-related crime, found that 61% of respondents were confident that they knew where to direct candidates to get advice or to report an issue.

Over half (53%) of SPOCs who responded to our survey said that the number of reports of threats, abuse and intimidation they received at this election had gone up in comparison to previous elections.

“[We] received less [Representation of the People Act 1983] type offences (imprints etc) but more complaints of harassment on social media, intimidation and physical assault. Most of the reports were between candidates and agents rather than intimidation or abuse from members of the public. The build-up in the final week prior to the election saw the most tension and increased reports. Many candidates reported 'threats' or harassment online which were not of criminal nature and more aligned to freedom of speech.”

“Candidates were harassed from hustings and canvassing, being chased in cars. Electoral posters were damaged and defaced. Material was created that was abusive and insulting (posters of candidates that had been doctored).”

Urgent action is needed to address abuse and intimidation

Strong differences of opinion are a normal part of political debate and campaigning. But it is never appropriate to abuse or intimidate campaigners. Unacceptable behaviour and negative political rhetoric may prevent campaigners from undertaking legitimate activities and may put some people off standing as a candidate altogether.

Several legislative changes have been made in recent years across the UK to tackle these problems. The Elections Act introduced a new electoral sanction to deter individuals from intimidating candidates or campaigners, by barring those convicted of a criminal offence from standing for, being elected to, or holding elective office for five years. It also clarified which activities are considered undue influence on voters (which is when someone uses, or threatens to use, force or violence to make someone vote a certain way or not vote at all) to make the legislation easier to interpret and enforce.

Candidates’ home addresses no longer need to be printed on ballot papers or shown on statements of persons nominated. The Welsh Government has extended this to candidates who are acting as their own election agent since 2022. They can provide a correspondence address which would be published in the statement of persons nominated and the public notice of the name and address of election agents instead.

Reasonable expenses which can be attributed to the protection of individuals or property do not count as election spending for candidates or parties. For example, hiring security, using a PO Box to avoid publicising a home or office address on imprints, or purchasing antivirus software for protecting campaign computers.

In Northern Ireland, Stormont’s Assembly Commission announced it would set up a fund to pay for increased security measures at the homes and offices of Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs).

While there has been progress in several areas, legislative change is only part of the response to the increasing levels of abuse and intimidation, which continue to have a detrimental impact on campaigning.

Following the general election, the Speaker of the House of Commons announced he would convene a Speaker’s Conference on abuse and intimidation. This is expected to consider ‘the factors influencing the threat levels against candidates and MPs and the effectiveness of the response to such threats’. The Speaker’s Conference will be central to developing effective responses to these problems and it is expected to ‘make recommendations about the arrangements necessary to secure free and fair elections and the appropriate protection of candidates at future UK-wide parliamentary elections and of elected representatives thereafter.’

Recommendation 4: Changes are needed to deter and respond to increasing levels of abuse and intimidation of candidates and campaigners

Candidates are reporting increasing concerns about abuse and intimidation that they have experienced at recent elections. These unacceptable actions risk putting off people wanting to stand for election. They also mean that voters may be prevented from hearing about policies and debates from a range of campaigners.

We will work with partners across the wider electoral community to understand what is driving abuse and intimidation, and to collectively develop effective responses to tackle these problems. We will support the Speaker’s Conference on threats against candidates and MPs, as well as the work led by the Home Office and the Defending Democracy Taskforce.

Police forces and prosecutors must continue to treat allegations and cases of election-related intimidation seriously. They must demonstrate that those committing offences against candidates and campaigners will face significant sanctions. Political parties must also play their part in strengthening deterrents. Key areas for potential reform and improvement include:

  • Ensuring that political parties include membership rules that explicitly emphasise respect for other campaigners, and enable them to take appropriate action to sanction members if they are found to have abused or harassed another campaigner (for example removal of membership or deselection as a candidate) 
  • Ensuring that the penalties for those found guilty of criminal offences committed against candidates, campaigners or elections staff reflect the wider impact as attacks on the democratic process.

There are opportunities to further strengthen protections for candidates and voters within the electoral process, including:

  • Extending the Welsh Government’s approach and legislation protecting the home addresses of candidates acting as their own election agents, to cover all UK elections
  • Considering, with police forces and Returning Officers, whether to establish secure zones where campaign activity would not be allowed around specific risk-assessed polling stations or count venues.

There is also scope to strengthen coordination and the proactive support offered to candidates ahead of and during elections, including:

  • Ensuring candidates receive clear information and guidance about how to access support – this could involve requiring candidates to provide police forces with contact details to allow them to share essential information and make contact in an emergency
  • Having a dedicated point of contact for candidates and campaigners, where they can request support and resources to deal with abuse and intimidation
  • Ensuring longer-term, stable funding arrangements for security support for candidates and elected representatives, including for local councillors and candidates, as has been proposed for MLAs in Northern Ireland. This support should be properly advertised and signposted so that candidates know it is available and something they can use.

Given the volume and scale of online abuse experienced by candidates and campaigners, social media and online platforms should do more to help develop improved screening tools for candidates’ digital profiles, to remove abusive content and identify perpetrators. These could be developed and delivered by individual digital/social media companies, or centrally, with civil society. Ofcom, the communications services regulator, should also consider how the new duties and responsibilities introduced by the Online Safety Act could be developed in the future to improve online protections for candidates and campaigners.

More widely, it will be essential to ensure there is a clear shared understanding of what constitutes unacceptable behaviour towards candidates and campaigners, as opposed to robust political debate. This is needed to support a consistent approach that protects candidates and gives them the confidence to participate. This should particularly take into account the differential experiences of those most affected by abuse and intimidation (including women, people from ethnic minority backgrounds, and disabled people).

These changes will require coordinated effort from a range of organisations from across the electoral and law enforcement sectors, including political parties and campaigners, local authorities, police forces and prosecuting authorities.

We will conduct research with the public to develop a clearer understanding of where the threshold lies between acceptable and unacceptable behaviour. We will continue to raise awareness of the fact that abusive behaviour towards campaigners and elected officials is never acceptable. We will also make sure that candidates and campaigners understand what is considered abuse and intimidation and know how to report it.

Recommendation 5: The process of candidate nominations should be reviewed

A small number of people took advantage of the limited requirements and checks for nominating candidates at the UK general election. This meant that voters in 11 constituencies were at risk of being misled about who they were able to vote for as candidates. The Returning Officers in those constituencies were put in a difficult position because they did not have clear powers to prevent voters being misled by these candidates.

The requirements and checks for nominating candidates should be strengthened to make it harder for candidates to mislead voters about their true identity. Voters must now provide proof of their identify when they register to vote, apply for an absent vote or cast their vote at a polling station – but candidates do not have to provide any proof of identity to be nominated.

Key areas for potential reform and improvement include:

  • Considering whether candidates could be required to provide proof of their identity as part of the nomination process – this should consider the impact on the accessibility, security and practical workability of the nomination process if providing and checking proof of identity could only be carried out in person
  • Looking again at the Law Commission’s previous recommendation that ‘Returning Officers should have an express power to reject nominations that use a candidate’s name which is designed to confuse or mislead electors or to obstruct the exercise of the franchise, or is obscene or offensive’ – while continuing to protect the impartiality that Returning Officers need to administer election processes
  • Reviewing the definition of offences (and penalties) for candidates making false statements in nomination papers to ensure that these continue to offer an appropriate and realistic deterrent to abuse of the nomination process.

Election law also requires candidates at a UK general election to make a declaration that they have not agreed to be nominated in more than one constituency. Making a false statement about this would be an offence. In practice, however, there is currently no mechanism to easily identify whether any candidates have agreed to be nominated in more than one constituency. It may also be necessary to develop a process for collating details of all candidates at a general election, in order to identify whether any have been nominated in more than one constituency.

The system of co-option in Northern Ireland risks not following voters’ decisions

In Northern Ireland, vacancies in the Assembly and in the 11 local councils are filled through a process called ‘co-option’: instead of holding a by-election, the nominating officer of a political party fills the vacancy created by the resignation or death of one of their members. This is because these elections use the Single Transferable Vote system, so co-option is in place to ensure that the preference of electors at the previous election continues to be reflected.

Following the 2024 UK general election, four sitting MLAs and one councillor were elected as MPs, so they had to resign from their other elected positions. Through co-option, the vacancies in the Assembly were replaced by a sitting councillor. This created a further four vacancies to be filled in the local councils, also through co-option.

There has been an increase in use of co-option in recent years. For example:

  • Nine MLAs (10% of all MLAs) and 24 councillors (5% of all council seats) have been co-opted since the 2022 and 2023 elections respectively
  • Between May 2019 and December 2022, 90 council vacancies were filled through co-option
  • Between March 2017 and March 2022, 29 MLAs were co-opted into the Assembly.

Co-option removes democratic choice from voters and reduces transparency. This issue is likely to be exacerbated in 2027 when both the Assembly and local government elections are scheduled to take place.

A ‘substitution list’ provided by candidates at the time of nomination may be one possible solution to this issue. Ahead of the 2027 elections, we will engage with the UK Government and political parties to maintain integrity and confidence in the electoral process.

Recommendation 6: Challenges to the resilience of the electoral system, including funding, should be addressed

The changes introduced by the Elections Act contributed to the workload of administrators. There is a clear sense in the feedback we received that they ‘got through it’ despite these challenges, rather than having sufficient time and capacity and fully functioning operational resources to support them to run the poll.

Broader local authority resilience remains a significant concern. It is reliant on a complex and fragmented funding framework, and underpinned by an outdated and increasingly complex system of electoral law.

Without significant change, including in the funding of elections, there continues to be the risk of administrative errors or failure of electoral administration processes in both the short and long terms. The UK Government has recently announced a strategic review of electoral registration and conduct. In a letter to the electoral sector, it acknowledged that ‘piling change upon change into an already busy and complex sector introduces ever increasing risks to the delivery of our elections.’

As part of its strategic review, the UK Government should consider whether the funding to run general elections continues to be appropriate and adequate to deliver elections in a way that meets voters’ expectations. This should include whether the UK Government should fund electoral registration activities. There is also a need for a comprehensive risk assessment of capacity and resilience within the sector, including the supplier market. Each of the UK’s governments should set out how they will make progress towards simplified, modernised, and consolidated election law, building on the comprehensive and well-supported recommendations of the UK’s Law Commissions.

Digital systems do not always work well enough for administrators

Ten years on since the introduction of individual electoral registration and the launch of the Individual Electoral Registration Digital Service (IERDS), there are now a number of digital services that electoral administrators are dependent on – this includes websites where voters can apply for an absent vote or request a Voter Authority Certificate, as well as the EROP. Both the IERDS and EROP are managed by the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG), which means that the UK Government is a vital service provider to Electoral Registration Officers and Returning Officers in a way that it was not previously.

In the run-up to and during both the May and July elections, administrators raised concerns about the operation and functionality of centrally provided digital systems, in particular the new online absent vote application process, as well as the compatibility between EMS systems and the centralised EROP. It was felt that having different digital systems (central and more localised) was resulting in reduced oversight and control of processes by Electoral Registration Officers and Returning Officers. In Scotland and Wales, a further issue was posed by the divergent requirements for reserved and devolved elections, given there is currently no mechanism to apply for an absent vote online for devolved polls.

“The interface with EMS and EROP for overseas electors is one of the most complex processes the team have ever had to deal with, it is a multi-stage, multi-screen, process with no logical flow.” 

“The use of separate Government portals for VACs, postals and proxies which did not easily communicate with each other made things overly complicated and again took the core elections time away from other duties. Whilst this may improve efficiency for electors, it does the opposite for administrators and makes it extremely clunky when processing alongside the EMS.”

A consistent theme in feedback from administrators was that EROP was ‘not fit for purpose’, with many expressing frustration at ‘glitches’ and ‘clunkiness’. Feedback from administrators highlighted the limited functionality of the EROP and the fact it did not easily integrate with existing EMS software. Some administrators told us they had to develop workarounds to overcome these challenges. Processing duplicate applications and overseas electors were a particular difficulty with the software.

“From 22 May to deadline days, 26,000 register to vote applications received, 15,500 postal vote applications, 3,000 proxy application and 600 VAC applications. The EROP not developed enough to cope with these volumes. We had to bring in significant additional support to cope.”

“Having three separate systems for postal, proxy and overseas applications meant that some electors were disenfranchised. It is impossible to monitor where someone has applied in more than one portal – so, for example, an elector applies to register overseas and also asks for a postal vote at the same time. The [postal vote application] gets worked first, but because we don't know they have made an application to register as an overseas (either because it hasn't been processed yet or only very recently), the postal vote is attached to their current domestic registration. Literally the same day/a couple of days later the [overseas application] is processed – domestic registration is removed and so is the postal vote attached. Significant numbers of [overseas electors] found they had no postal vote because of this exact scenario.”

Reliance on centralised systems may also have had repercussions on the voter experience. Some administrators raised concerns with the information and messaging provided to both domestic and overseas voters with regards to when and/or how to apply for an absent vote, and when they might expect to receive their postal votes.

While improvements can and should be made to the voter-facing system, not least to ensure clearer messaging, more significant changes to the operation of digital systems are required to support administrators to deliver their duties.

“The single national portal for applications is beneficial to electors, but takes them out of the local conversation where more useful local knowledge about when we can send postal votes and considerations for sending postal votes overseas is available. The national portal back-ends this communication until after the application is made, frustrating voters who may have chosen a different option had they had all of the relevant information in advance. The performance of the EMS in sending communications to applicants is too slow to keep up with the volume of work coming through, requiring officers to run letters and emails overnight and on additional laptops to keep up.”

Recommendation 7: Digital systems need improvement to better support electoral administrators

Administrators need to be able to rely on functional, joined-up digital systems to deliver their duties. This is especially important in the run-up to elections when they are under significant pressure to deliver.

The UK Government should work with the electoral community to continue to improve the digital systems that it provides. This includes working with EMS suppliers to ensure the central digital portal operates effectively with the systems that Returning Officers and Electoral Registration Officers use to run elections locally.

The UK Government should also ensure that it carefully manages the implementation of changes to digital systems, including thorough testing before changes are applied. This should include ensuring that operational advice from electoral administrators is sought and taken into account before confirming whether and when changes will go live. In particular, the UK Government should improve the operation and functionality of the ERO portal to better support electoral administrators and ensure its integration and compatibility with EMS software.

Page history

First published: 7 October 2024

Last updated: 15 November 2024