Parliamentary briefing: Representation of the People Bill
Tuesday 1 September 2026
This briefing highlights key considerations ahead of Report Stage and Third Reading of the Representation of the People Bill. It outlines the Electoral Commission’s position on its key measures.
The Electoral Commission is the independent body which oversees elections and regulates political finance in the UK. We promote public confidence in the democratic process and ensure its integrity, and we support participation in elections through our public awareness and democratic education work. A key part of our role is to advise Parliament on legislation relating to elections and the regulation of political finance.
We will continue to provide independent advice to parliamentarians on the contents of the Bill, based on published evidence and our expertise. This will include more detailed information on individual clauses during the Bill’s passage through Parliament.
Once the Bill has been passed into law, we will work with voters, electoral administrators, political parties and campaigners to ensure everyone involved in elections understands and is prepared for the changes.
Our view on the bill
The Representation of the People Bill has the potential to significantly improve the electoral system for voters, parties, campaigners and administrators. Changes to voter registration and political finance rules will bring particular benefits. Lowering the voting age will give around 1.7 million additional people the right to vote.
These reforms should strengthen the resilience and integrity of our electoral system, tackle many of the threats it faces and improve how elections work for those who participate.
While the Commission welcomes many of the changes set out in the Bill, some provisions could be strengthened further to improve the experience for voters and better protect the system from foreign interference.
The timetable for automated voter registration is unlikely to deliver benefits for voters before the next general election unless the Government thinks more ambitiously and flexibly about the way it intends to pilot and implement the scheme. The successful pilots in Wales last year show this is possible.
The recent Rycroft Review into foreign financial influence and interference has rightly sounded the alarm on foreign interests seeking to interfere or exert influence on UK politics. The Bill offers a timely opportunity, where feasible, to act on the review’s proposals for strengthening the political finance system.
We welcome the UK Government’s intention to amend the Bill to implement the review’s recommendation to use profit, not revenue, to determine how much a company can donate. This will make sure that voters can have confidence that entities are only able to influence the political process in a way that is more directly tied to the value of money they have made in the UK, and more closely reflects their true financial capacity to donate to UK politics from that money.
This will significantly improve the Bill’s protections against foreign interference, and give voters confidence that only money made in the UK is funding donations to parties and campaigners. While we welcome the change of metric from revenue to profit, there are several opportunities, as recommended in the Rycroft Review, to further strengthen these controls to ensure they provide an effective and workable limit on these types of donations.
The Commission will work with the Government to support effective implementation of the Bill, making sure voters, political parties, campaigners and candidates, and electoral administrators have sufficient notice to understand and prepare for changes. Implementation should balance pace with practicality, recognising the scale of reform.
Any change to the electoral system should improve the experience for voters, be workable, and improve the system’s security and accessibility. It is a crucial principle that changes to any electoral legislation should be clear at least six months before they are due to be implemented or complied with.
The progress of the Bill is already delayed. Even on the Government’s current timetable, the timing for implementation of the complex measures is incredibly tight. The scale of change should not be underestimated. It is important there is sufficient time to put in place the necessary guidance, resources and public awareness campaigns to help those participating in and delivering elections understand what the changes mean for them. Further delay to the Bill’s progress will risk our and our stakeholders’ ability to implement changes for the 2028 and 2029 scheduled elections across the UK, and is likely to impact our ability to deliver clear and effective messaging to voters, candidates, campaigners and electoral administrators.
Part 1: Young voters
Part 1 of the Bill extends the right to vote to 16- and 17-year-olds for elections to the UK Parliament, Northern Ireland Assembly and to local elections in England and Northern Ireland.
Votes at 16
Extending the franchise to 16- and 17-year-olds will give around 1.7m additional people the right to vote. It would align the voting age with devolved elections in Scotland and Wales, where 16- and 17-year-olds already have the right to vote.
Although the Commission doesn’t take a view on the principle of franchise changes, which are significant constitutional questions for Parliament to consider, all those who are eligible to vote in elections should be able to do so freely and without barriers. Currently, 16- and 17-year-olds are the group least likely to be on the electoral register.
Our priority will be to ensure that all newly enfranchised voters know how to register and exercise their right to vote, have access to educational material through their schools, colleges and communities, and to support the electoral community to deliver franchise changes effectively.
Research across several countries and states that have lowered their voting ages shows that when enfranchised, 16 and 17-year-olds tend to vote in greater numbers than those enfranchised at 18. 16 and 17-year-olds can already vote in Scottish Parliament elections, Senedd elections, and local elections in Scotland and Wales.
Extending the franchise to 16- and 17-year-olds increases the importance of equipping young people with the confidence to participate, so that they can continue to do so into the future. Our research shows that most young people support learning more about politics and elections:
- 72% of young people think children and young people should learn more about politics in school/college
- 53% of young people want to learn more about what difference their vote makes
We will build on our democratic education work to improve young people’s understanding of electoral systems, expanding our work to provide teachers and students with resources and support to deliver democratic education.
Key considerations
- As recommended by the Curriculum and Assessment review, the curriculum should be changed to help prepare young people to cast their vote confidently. All children should have the opportunity to participate in democratic education throughout their time in school.
- Changes to the voting age also need to be implemented in a way which carefully manages the pressures on election teams.
- Implementing automated or automatic registration and including forms of voter ID more likely to be held by younger voters would help ensure young people are registered and able to vote once enfranchised.
Part 2: Registration of voters
Part 2 of the bill introduces changes to enable automated or direct registration.
Automatic or direct registration
Having complete and accurate registers is fundamental to democratic participation – if voters are not correctly registered, they cannot participate. Our research shows that as many as 8 million people across the UK are not correctly registered to vote.
The requirement to submit an application to be registered can be a barrier to some, and we know that some groups of people are less likely to be registered correctly: attainers and other young people, people who live in private rented accommodation, disabled people, and recent home-movers.
The Bill includes provisions that would enable automatic or direct registration. When commenced, these would impose a duty on Electoral Registration Officers (EROs) to register voters (or update a person’s details on the register) without requiring them to submit registration applications. An automated registration process would remove barriers for voters and make it easier to register and vote.
As well as direct registration, the Government is exploring other forms of automated registration. These range from integrated registration – where applications for other services, such as obtaining a passport or driving licence, are used to prompt users to register to vote – to assisted registration, where EROs could use the information to offer targeted support to people rather than register them automatically.
The Bill includes a power for regulations to be made to enable relevant data to be
shared between (for example) Government departments, public bodies and EROs, to support these new forms of electoral registration.
While the final version of automatic/direct registration may take longer, we believe that significant progress can be made on integrated and some automatic registration implementation before the next general election, adding significant numbers to the electoral register accurately, and in particular helping add new 16- and 17-year-old voters to the register. Successful pilots in Wales last year show how effective this can be.
The Bill also includes powers to pilot the direct registration provisions before they are
brought into effect. The Commission will independently evaluate automatic or direct registration pilots and continue to provide support and guidance to EROs, who under these proposals would continue to be responsible for compiling and maintaining the electoral registers throughout the year.
We are urging the Government to move quickly to introduce automated systems to enable voters to be added to UK parliamentary electoral registers, in time for the next general election. We expect significant progress in rolling out integrated registration and, subject to successful pilots, the introduction of direct registration. We also currently run public awareness campaigns to promote voter registration ahead of elections. We will continue to do this, adapting our campaign approach to ensure it reflects the final registration model and accounting for possible divergence across the UK.
Key considerations
- Implementing automated and automatic registration systems will help reduce the large number of eligible voters unregistered, as shown in countries around the world. Recent pilots in Wales successfully identified and added just over 14,500 new voters to registers, including a significant number of attainers – with high accuracy.
- We welcome the Welsh Government laying regulations to enable automatic voter registration for Senedd and local government elections. However, the development of parallel systems across the UK creates a potential risk of divergence, which may lead to voter confusion and poor value for money.
- We urge the UK's governments to continue to work closely together at all stages of legislation and implementation to learn from each other’s experiences and ultimately align their AVR systems for the benefit of administrators and, most importantly, voters.
Part 3: Conduct of elections
Part 3 of the Bill makes several changes to how elections are conducted, including expanding the list of IDs accepted at polling stations to include bank cards, making changes to absent voting and candidate nomination processes, and changes intended to address candidate security at elections.
Expanding the list of accepted voter ID
The 2024 general election was the first at which voters were required to show photo ID when voting in polling stations, and most people were able to vote successfully. Our research found:
- fewer than 0.1% of people in Great Britain who tried to vote at a polling station were unable to because they could not present an accepted form of ID
- around 4% of people who did not vote said that the requirement to show ID was a factor
- that the requirement to show voter ID affected some people more than others, particularly people from a disadvantaged background.
We recommended that the Government review the list of accepted IDs and the way the Voter Authority Certificate is issued, including whether there could be a later deadline to apply for a digitally-issued VAC. We also recommended that options for voters without accepted ID – such as attestation or ‘vouching’ – be considered.
The Bill proposes expanding the list of ID accepted at polling stations to include bank cards as a non-photo form of ID for elections in Great Britain, and clarifies that digital versions of ID can be accepted at polling stations if they can be verified visually. Bank cards must include the person’s full name and be within a visible expiry date to be accepted.
We will inform voters of any changes to accepted forms of ID, and continue to communicate when they need to show ID and how they can apply for a Voter Authority Certificate as an alternative. We will support electoral administrators and polling station staff in managing the voter ID verification process.
Bank cards as voter ID
Allowing voters to show bank cards as a form of ID is less secure than the current requirements, where voters need to show photo ID at polling stations. Because bank cards do not include a photo they make it harder for polling station staff to verify a person’s identity.
It will also require staff to have a different way of checking ID because there is no common format, design or validation feature for bank cards, which is the case for other forms of ID.
Digital ID and voter authority certificates
Adding digital ID to vote at a polling station gives voters more flexibility and options for proving their identity.
Key considerations
- Introducing bank cards as voter ID will weaken security. This is because bank cards do not have a photo, so it is harder for polling station staff to verify a person’s identity.
- We have previously recommended introducing ‘vouching’ or attestation at polling stations. Canada uses ‘vouching’ at its federal elections. It allows registered voters with an accepted form of ID to vouch for someone who does not have accepted ID. As a result, it keeps a link with a named voter who can prove their ID.
- The changes would also introduce significant differences between the requirements in Northern Ireland and those in Great Britain, which could create voter confusion, although ultimately other arrangements in Northern Ireland are well-embedded.
Further reading
Measures to improve candidate security
Further provisions relating to candidate security are in Part 6 of the bill. The Commission’s wider views are set out in the relevant section of the briefing.
Part 3 of the Bill proposes some key changes to improve the security of candidates and agents. It removes the requirement to publish election agents’ (including candidates acting as their own agents) home addresses, allowing them to protect themselves by choosing not to have their personal information shared in a way that could make them vulnerable to abuse.
Removing the requirement in Northern Ireland for a poll clerk to shout out the name and number of everyone who they deliver a ballot paper to helps to protect voters from potentially unwelcome or intimidatory behaviour.
The Bill also makes provision for candidates to complete and return a ‘police contact form’ with their nomination papers, so that the candidate can be contacted by the police in connection with matters relating to the candidate’s safety. Ahead of the May 2026 elections, the Commission introduced candidate contact forms in nomination packs to support the sharing of candidate details between returning officers and the relevant police contacts.
Changes to the nominations process
Under current rules, a candidate must complete a set of nomination papers and sign a declaration of truth that the details they have provided are accurate. There is no requirement for a candidate to show ID as part of this, but it is an offence to provide a false statement on nomination papers.
The 2024 general election presented new challenges to the nomination system, with reports of alleged fake candidates and multiple candidates of the same name. The Commission recommended strengthening the process requirements to deter candidates from misleading voters about their true identities.
The Bill makes a number of changes to the nominations process. It proposes requiring that the nomination paper be accompanied by prescribed documents providing evidence of the candidate’s identity. It introduces a new statutory declaration form that the candidate has not provided false information on their nomination.
Part 3 also enables parties to withdraw support from a candidate up to 48 hours before the end of the nominations period and amends key deadlines for the nominations process.
The Commission will support Returning Officers to manage changes in the nominations process, and update guidance for candidates and agents to reflect these changes.
Key considerations
- Changes to the nominations process need to strike a balance between security, accessibility and workability.
- The new requirement for candidates to show ID would provide assurance that the person named on the nomination paper exists as a real person. But it would not necessarily ensure that this is the same person who has submitted the nomination or consented to be nominated. This could only be achieved by requiring nomination papers to be submitted in person, allowing a visual check of the ID, which would significantly reduce the accessibility of the nominations process and increase the impact on Returning Officers and electoral administrators.
- These new requirements must also be workable in practice. The proposed measures would place additional requirements on electoral administrators to check the validity of identity documents for every candidate at a critical point in the election timetable.
- It is important that measures to enable parties to withdraw support maintain fairness to candidates and subscribers. Parties should be responsible for carrying out due diligence on their candidates before the nominations period. Late changes to candidates risk confusing voters, particularly if a candidate has already started campaigning and, depending on the timing of the withdrawal of authorisation, there may be limited time for candidates to obtain the necessary support from subscribers and submit new nomination papers before the deadline.
Absent voting
More than 1.3 million people applied to vote by post at the 2024 general election. While most postal votes were received on time, some postal voters did not receive their ballot packs in time to complete and return them before polling day.
The Commission recommended improvements to the postal voting system to improve the service for voters, including considering whether the deadlines allow sufficient time to process postal votes.
The Bill moves the deadline for applying for a postal vote from 11 working days before the poll to 14 working days, makes provision for Returning Officers to issue replacement postal votes from after the application deadline, and allows voters to cancel their postal vote to vote in person or via emergency proxy.
Key considerations
- Other forms of early or flexible voting could give voters further alternatives to postal or proxy voting. The Commission has carried out feasibility studies on whether potential alternatives, like advance voting or mobile voting in places like care homes, could work for elections in the UK.
- The Government piloted two different flexible voting methods at the May 2026 local elections in England: early voting and voting at a centralised hub on normal polling day.
- Our statutory evaluation found that the pilots were delivered successfully and received positive feedback from voters and electoral administrators. While uptake was limited, there was strong support for future flexible voting, particularly among newer voters.
Part 4: Campaigns and political expenditure
Part 4 of the Bill introduces several reforms to the political finance system. The Commission has recommended some of these changes since 2013 to strengthen the system, particularly from foreign interference.
Company donations
Currently, if a company is registered at Companies House and ‘carrying on business’ in the UK, it can donate to a UK political party or campaigner. The company does not need to have made enough money in the UK to cover the donations it makes. This opens the system to donations funded from activity overseas as foreign actors could, within the law, use a UK company as a conduit to channel money into UK elections.
As drafted, the Bill would introduce additional controls to reduce the risk of companies being used to allow foreign funding of campaigners in the UK, including a revenue test to limit the amount that companies can donate each year. However, using a company’s revenue to define the limit would mean that companies can still donate more money overall than they have made in the UK.
The Government has tabled amendments which would replace revenue with profit as the metric for calculating how much a company can donate to a political party. We strongly support this change. Using profit instead of revenue ensures voters can have the confidence that entities are only able to influence the political process in a way that is more directly tied to the value of money they have made linked to the UK, and more closely reflects their true financial capacity to donate to UK politics from that money.
While we welcome the move to a profit limit, as recommended in the Rycroft Review and previously by the Commission, there are several outstanding issues and opportunities to further strengthen these controls to ensure they provide an effective and workable limit on donations by companies.
Key considerations
- Clause 60 would apply the company donation limit separately to each recipient, so a company could donate an amount equal to their profit to a party and then donate the same amount to each of the party’s (or multiple parties’) MPs, councillors and candidates.
- For the profit-based limit to be at all effective, it must apply to the total value of a company’s political donations in a calendar year, regardless of the number of recipients. This could be achieved through a donor declaration, with minimal administrative burden.
- We agree with the Rycroft Review’s recommendation that the average (over two years) rather than total of company donations should be used for a profit test calculation. Using an average of profits would help to smooth the impact of natural changes in a company’s level of profitability, while avoiding the risk that exceptional profit reported in a single year could be used to set a limit for large donations in subsequent years.
'Know your donor’ checks
Political parties, candidates and campaigners are responsible for ensuring donations made to them are from permissible sources.
The introduction of ‘know your donor’ checks would require parties and campaigners to carry out a more rigorous assessment of the donations they receive. Such checks would give parties and campaigners greater confidence when deciding whether to accept donations.
For example, parties and campaigners would need to take steps to make sure they have sufficient specific information about the organisation or individual donating to enable them to make a more informed choice. Such checks have existed for some time in charity law.
These new requirements should be introduced in a way that recognises the need for proportionality and limits the administrative burden on those accepting donations.
We recommend strengthening the risk assessments by adding a requirement to consider any other factors a reasonable party would consider relevant. The current drafting allows donees to rely on a defence that they did not consider a risk factor to be relevant when deciding whether to accept a donation.
Key considerations
- ‘Know your donor’ checks should be proportionate and workable, to avoid placing an administrative burden on donees. The thresholds at which a risk assessment is required should be changed so that the regime is sensitive to the varying levels of risk faced by different donees. The Government should consult with the regulated community over which factors should be considered in such a risk assessment. It is important that their practical experience and expertise informs the legislation so it is workable.
Unincorporated associations
Unincorporated associations are associations of individuals who have joined together to carry out a shared purpose.
The Commission has highlighted weaknesses in the political finance regime as regards unincorporated associations for many years. Currently, they are not required to verify donor eligibility, and there is no bar to individuals outside the UK being members of an unincorporated association. This means they could make lawful donations using funding from otherwise impermissible sources, including from overseas.
Changes proposed in the Bill would prevent unincorporated associations which are subject to reporting requirements from making political donations funded by impermissible donors.
The Bill’s provisions would also improve transparency around the funding of unincorporated associations - meaning they will need to register and start reporting the money they receive once they hit a threshold of £11,180 and report any gifts over £2,230.
Part 5: Enforcement and the Electoral Commission
Part 5 of the Bill introduces reforms to strengthen the enforcement of the UK’s political finance laws.
Candidate enforcement regime
Currently, individual police forces and prosecuting authorities are responsible for investigating and enforcing alleged political finance offences by election candidates. Criminal investigations and prosecutions may, in some cases, be disproportionate to the severity of the alleged offences. This can mean that prosecutions are not always taken forward, leading to an enforcement gap. The threat of criminal sanctions also deters people from standing for office or acting as an agent.
The Bill would give responsibility for investigating and enforcing certain political finance offences relating to candidates and local third-party campaigners to the Electoral Commission, rather than the police. These offences would be subject to civil sanctions (for example, a fine or an enforcement undertaking) rather than criminal sanctions, which could lead to imprisonment and a criminal record.
Further changes needed to simplify candidate spending return rules
Currently candidates/agents must submit spending returns and declarations to the returning officer (RO) for the constituency or local authority. As our new enforcement functions come into place with the enactment of the Bill, candidates/agents will continue to be required to submit their returns to ROs but the Bill as drafted will also require them to submit a copy to the Commission.
To ensure a simplified returns system and for the Commission to carry out its role effectively, it would be more practical for this to be switched, with returns delivered to the Commission as the primary recipient and copies going to the RO.
This would enable the regulated community to make use of our new Political Finance Online system, once established. The PFO system will produce an exact copy of the return, which candidates/agents can use to submit to ROs. This would ensure consistent submissions to the Commission and ROs and reduce the burden on candidates themselves.
Key considerations
- Extending the Electoral Commission’s remit to include enforcement of the rules for candidates and local third-party campaigners would create a more proportionate, consistent, effective and joined-up regime covering both the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act and the Representation of the People Act, while retaining criminal prosecution for the most serious cases.
- Further changes are needed to simplify the requirements for candidate spending returns, so that candidates will not need to send copies to two separate individuals or organisations in future.
Decriminalising administrative offences
Decriminalising administrative offences would create a more proportionate enforcement system, where legislation targets those actively seeking to evade regulation rather than criminal enforcement efforts being directed toward low-level offences that could be better addressed through the Commission’s advice or guidance.
Key considerations
- This proposal aims to make sanctions more proportionate and reduce the ‘chilling effect’ which may deter volunteers or less experienced individuals from taking on roles such as treasurer or election agent due to fear of criminal prosecution resulting from inadvertent mistakes related to reporting or filing paperwork.
A more effective and proportionate regulatory toolkit
We have a number of powers to enable us to apply a proportionate enforcement approach. Still, there are areas for improvement to support a stronger, simpler and streamlined regulatory system.
The Bill proposes providing the Commission with more proportionate regulatory tools, including increasing the maximum fine for political finance offences and improving how we share information.
Currently, the maximum civil fine for breaches of political finance law is £20,000. This was last updated in 2009 and does not reflect the scale of donations and spending in modern campaigning, which can involve almost a hundred million pounds for the largest political parties.
Improving how we share information with other organisations would allow closer collaboration. This would cover how we share information with the police and other regulators to support their functions. It would allow us to work with partners more efficiently.
Key considerations
- Increasing the maximum civil fine for political finance offences to £500,000, in line with the fine for offences at Scottish referendums, would support a more proportionate and effective sanctions regime that would better deter non-compliance.
Part 6 – Hostility towards candidates etc: disqualification orders and sentencing
Part 6 of the Bill introduces several provisions to address hostility towards candidates.
Candidate security
There has been a worrying rise in the abuse and intimidation of candidates in recent years. This has a significant impact on individuals and can deter those considering standing, thereby limiting the diversity of candidates and choices for voters.
At the 2024 general election, we found that over half (55%) of candidates felt they had experienced some harassment, intimidation or abuse. Women were twice as likely, and ethnic minority respondents three times as likely, to report serious abuse.
The Bill proposes adding a statutory aggravating factor in sentencing for certain election-related offences where they are motivated by hostility, and extends disqualification orders to include offences against electoral staff. This reflects the seriousness of these offences and should help deter potential offenders from engaging in abusive behaviour.
The Commission supports candidates, campaigners and parties to understand what constitutes abuse and where to go if they experience it. Ahead of the May 2026 elections, the Commission also published a set of principles for campaigning, with a focus on maintaining respect, safety and honesty during robust debate. We are now considering our approach to expanding these and how a code of conduct for campaigning, as recommended by the Speaker’s Conference, can facilitate a robust but respectful campaigning environment.
We will continue to work closely with partners, including the police, to provide support in tackling allegations of abuse. We will work with the Government to update guidance for police, electoral administrators and candidates on the safety and security of elections.
Key considerations
- We strongly welcome these provisions.
- Further changes may be needed to improve candidate safety, beyond the measures in the Bill. Social media platforms must do more to remove abusive content and develop improved screening tools to identify perpetrators.
- We recommend that the Government consider creating a clearer new overarching duty on platforms operating in the UK to cover a wider range of risks to elections, to ensure they take action to mitigate risks and protect legitimate political debate, particularly during critical election periods. This would help provide clarity and a shared understanding of the actions platforms are required to take during elections, and provide a clearer basis for Ofcom to take enforcement action if those actions are not taken.
- Democratic education must also play a part in tackling abuse by reforming citizenship education to prepare young people to participate in democracy.